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Abstract 
Government leaders stand to benefit from improved program management capabilities 
within their organizations. Often, they are faced with crisis situations that require a rapid-fire, 
precise, effective problem solving process. Some of these programs are more severe or complex 
than others. With time and certainty of the solution as constraints, efficient program management 
supporting the Defense Acquisition Life Cycle remains an enigma for organizations at best and a 
hazard at worst.  
Program management dealing with crisis problem solving, which is characterized by 
critical events and high cost, is a real-time process where requirements are identified and 
resolved to achieve a desired goal, with the path to the goal blocked by known or unknown 
obstacles. Program management that deals with crisis problem solving situations are plagued by 
several issues.  The crisis situation is likely one not previously encountered; therefore, solutions 
from past experiences cannot be drawn upon to solve the problem (Heichal, 1992). An individual 
not experienced or trained often feels the situation is too complex, information is incomplete, 
time is short, and failure consequences are extreme (Hockey, 1986). Managers who face these 
dilemmas must have responsive, failure-proof processes in place.  
This dissertation explores program management as it deals with problem solving 
processes in time-critical contexts, including task consolidation and resource selection, with the 
critical objective of improving crisis event management. The intent is to focus on processes that 
can be improved in crisis problem solving, specifically time needed to execute current problem 
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solving processes, and introduce a kinetic problem solving approach to increase the momentum 
of implementing the solutions during crisis situations. This flexibility is facilitated by the 
researcher’s genuine desire to improve the organizational situation (rather than merely study it) 
and a client’s willingness to share the details of how they will use the technology and lessons 
learned. 
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1. 
Introduction  
 The need for accelerating the process of implementing solutions during crisis problem 
solving began with the creation of the United Special Operations Command and its role in 
critical time sensitive problems.  On November 4, 1979, 3,000 Iranian students stormed the U.S. 
embassy in Tehran.  The event was fueled by President Jimmy Carter allowing the deposed 
Iranian ruler Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi into the United States for cancer treatment. 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called for the Shah to be returned. After five months, 53 U.S. 
hostages were still held in Iran due to failed negotiations (Kamps, 2006).    
During these five months, military leaders developed a rescue plan. The plan 
incorporated equipment and men from all four branches of the armed services.  The two-day 
operation utilized helicopters and a C-130 aircraft at a meeting point 200 miles from Tehran. The 
plan was for a C-130 aircraft to deliver troops and fuel for the helicopters.  Then, the helicopters 
would move to the location from which the rescue mission would begin.  The rescue would be 
called “Operation Eagle Claw” (Lambert, 2015). 
Operation Eagle Claw commenced when the landing zone (a predetermined location to 
land aircraft) named Desert One was secured. Eight navy helicopters were dispatched from the 
USS Nimitz, a ship stationed off the coast of Iran. Of the eight navy helicopters, two experienced 
mechanical failure and could not continue. The remaining six were delayed by a dust storm and 
landed 90 minutes late. Once on the ground, another helicopter broke down.  Operation Eagle 
Claw did not accomplish the rescue mission; with only five helicopters, the operation was 
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aborted.  Then, while departing from Desert One, one helicopter collided with a C-130, 
destroying the helicopter and the C-130. Five airmen and three marines were killed in the 
accident (Kamps, 2006). (Figure 1)  
 
Figure 1: Operation Eagle Claw: The Iran Hostage Rescue Mission, Air & Space Journal, 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2006/3tri06/kampseng.html#Kamps 
The failure of Operation Eagle Claw required a change inside the military’s operating 
procedures. The conclusions from investigations into the failure revealed a lack of coordination 
within the military services and shortcomings inherent to compartmentalized training and 
inadequate equipment.  Based on the failure of Operation Eagle Claw, the United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) was created, along with the development of two elite 
counterterrorism Special Missions Units (SMU): The United States Army’s 1st Special Forces 
Operational Detachment- Delta (1st SFOD-D), or Delta Force, and the United States Naval 
Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU), or Seal Team Six (Lambert, 2015). These 
teams were designed to be fast and agile so that they could accomplish time sensitive missions; 
they required a support system that could keep pace with their fast, agile design. 
Delta Force and SEAL Team Six are SMUs under the command of the Joint Special 
Operations Command (JSOC). They specialize in counterterrorism and are trained in Close 
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Quarters Combat (CQB), hostage rescue, and other specialized operations.  These teams also 
specialize in time critical sensitive operations where failure can lead to loss of life. 
 
Just as the failure of Operation Eagle Claw changed the military’s internal operating 
procedures, this dissertation defines a transformation for the acquisition process of critical time 
sensitive problems. It examines the need to solve critical time sensitive problems within the 
military more expeditiously and illustrates the individual steps taken to develop viable solutions 
to critical time sensitive problems.  
The acquisition process for developing new technology typically takes two to four years. 
A clear understanding of why so much time is required when using the traditional Defense 
Acquisition Life Cycle (DALC) is needed in order to develop a new process that will enable 
these programs (see Appendix 1: Defense Acquisitions Life Cycle Objectives) to be 
accomplished in a shorter time. The table below describes key terms used in DALC. 
Special Missions Units (SMU) from United States Special Operations Command were 
created specifically to work outside of the large bureaucracy and framework of the larger 
Department of Defense (DoD).  SMUs need to work in a responsive fashion and be able to act 
more quickly than an entire battalion or a battleship can react.  The entire concept of SMUs is an 
evolving experiment that requires creativity of how to operate within the larger defense 
frameworks but not become encumbered by the slower processes used to run the larger 
components of the defense community.   
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Table 1: Descriptions of Key DALC Terms 
Program  A group of related projects managed in a 
coordinated way to obtain benefits and control not 
available from managing them individually. 
Acquisition Process A directed, funded effort designed to provide a 
new, improved, or continuing weapon system or 
automated information system (AIS) capability in 
response to a valid operational need; the DALC. 
Project A temporary endeavor undertaken to create a 
unique product or service; has a definite 
beginning and an end; has a limited duration. 
Requirement Constraints, demands, necessities, needs, or 
parameters that must be met or satisfied, usually 
within a certain timeframe to accomplish a DoD 
mission. 
 
1.1 DALC processes 
 The DALC processes were designed to support very large, complicated, expensive 
programs. Examples include designing new transport vehicles, such as aircraft carriers and 
battleships or the fleet of aircraft throughout each branch of the military.  The myriad steps in 
these processes and the time required to complete these intricate checks and balances are meant 
to insure that billion dollar programs do not go awry and sensitive military information is kept in 
secured locations to maintain technological and asymmetric advantages over American enemies 
and adversaries.  The SMUs are laser focused on very 
specific, usually time bound missions, such as 
surveillance and reconnaissance or a rapid, surgical strike 
against a high value target (HVT).  To ensure the safety 
of the soldiers in the SMUs and minimize collateral 
damage of the innocent, the SMUs need the ability and 
A program is a response to meet a 
stated requirement. To execute a 
program, funding is made 
available so that a solution can be 
developed, hired, or bought using 
the military acquisition process, 
also known as the Defense 
Acquisitions Life Cycle. 
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freedom to rapidly plan, insert technology, and execute the missions quickly as the scenarios 
unfold.   The problem facing SMUs is how to reduce the time needed to solve problems in an 
acquisition process that is currently one size fits all for the Department of Defense.  
The approach to problem solving in DALC programs has three distinct activities: (1) the 
pre-process is the planning, training, and execution that takes places before a requirement is 
stated and the DALC starts; (2) the DALC is the execution of the process; and, (3) the post-
activities process is the evaluation of the execution of the DALC in consideration of the stated 
requirements. These three activities are briefly described below.  
1.1.1. Pre-process Activities 
 The Pre-Process for a laboratory team traditionally begins when a problem is identified.  
A laboratory team is comprised of individuals who work on the program. Members are internal 
staff and consultants. Team member roles include Program Manager, Technical Director, 
Systems Engineer, Subject Matter Experts, and Administrative support. The team must develop a 
working relationship with military commands and the units in the command. The laboratory team 
also must become familiar with the equipment the units have and how the technology is 
employed. This pre-process is critical and can be time consuming.   
1.1.2. Execution Activities 
 The Execution Process begins when the government support activity is called by a unit 
and support is requested. The government support activity starts the DALC process and contacts 
the laboratory and describes the situation that has developed which involves critical time 
sensitive problems.  The DALC process requires all of the following steps to be accomplished: 
 Development of a capability deficiency document (CDD) 
 Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) 
 Materiel Solutions Analysis (MSA) 
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 Analysis Of Alternatives (AOA) 
 Detailed engineering plans 
 Integrated Master Plan (IMP)   
 Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) 
 Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) 
Additional sub-steps are required within each of these major steps. Appendix 1, Defense 
Acquisitions Life Cycle Objectives, shows the steps required to accomplish a program. 
1.1.3. Post-process Activities 
The post-process has several deliverables. First and foremost, the working hardware or 
software solution the team has developed and formal written reports are produced to include an 
After Action Report (AAR) that compiles comments and data from the customer and team; this 
can take up to 30 days. A Preliminary Design Reviews (PDR) uses the information gathered 
during the technical PDR to produce a written report in 15 to 20 days; a Critical Design Reviews 
(CDR) takes 15 to 20 days to capture all of the inputs. A System Verification Review (SVR) 
details all of the information produced during the final developmental testing and can take up to 
30 days. 
1.2 Assumptions 
The measure of the Kinetic Problem Solving process is the improvements in terms of cost 
and time. The main assumption in this paper is the quality of the solution.  The clients supported 
by these programs have a zero fail level of quality.  If a solution cannot meet this level of quality, 
then there is no delivery.  The time overruns are measured by the additional time needed to 
deliver a no fail solution.  These overruns also translate to additional cost to the client and the 
Laboratory. 
1.3 Research Question and Objective 
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A new process for accelerating the implementing of solutions during crisis problem 
solving would reduce the amount of time it takes to deliver results to units.  By taking the 
traditional acquisition process handcuffs off of the Laboratory teams, advanced solutions can be 
developed and provided to the military in a shorter amount of time. 
Below are the Research Question and Research Objective that guide this research: 
Research Question:  How can we complete programs faster without reducing the quality 
of the solution? 
Research Objective: Formulate a modification to the acquisition process for facilitating 
the fast generation of viable solutions to an urgent crisis problem situation. 
1.4 Dissertation Structure 
This dissertation is structured as follows. The literature review section presents the books, 
reports, and articles that describe the problems with the DALC process and the steps that have 
been taken to reform or change it.  Relevant literature on program management and decision 
making in crisis situations is also introduced. In the methods section, we describe in detail the 
methodology used in this dissertation, which is Action Research.  We also discuss why this 
method is appropriate for answering the Research Question above.  In this chapter, we further 
describe the setting of the research and the DALC processes in place at the start of the 
dissertation research. In the Applied Action Research Chapter, we describe the application of the 
Action Research methodology to the analysis of the DALC processes.  More specifically, we 
describe how we used the Action Research methodology to make changes to the DALC process 
in order to develop a new process. The Results Chapter assesses the effectiveness of the new 
process. We compare completion times in DALC processes that are realized because of the 
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introduction of the new processes. The Discussion Chapter addresses the work accomplished in 
this study and what needs to be addressed in future research to improve the DALC process. 
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2. 
Literature Review 
 This review summarizes the research literature for some of the main disciplines 
contributing to the current understanding and practice of program management teams in crisis 
situations with time sensitive outcomes.  The review focuses on current literature to determine if 
others have experienced similar problems and, if so, how they have attempted to answer the 
question this study seeks to answer, which is: “How can we complete programs faster without 
reducing the quality of the solution?” 
Though program management has existed since before the days of the great pyramids, it 
has enjoyed a surge of popularity beginning in the 1960s. A program put U.S. astronaut Neil 
Armstrong on the moon. A program named “Desert Storm” freed the nation of Kuwait. An 
annual program brings Girl Scout cookies as a sign that winter is just about finished. The use of 
program management to accomplish the many and diverse aims of society’s organizations 
continues to grow. Businesses regularly use program management to accomplish unique 
outcomes with limited resources under critical time constraints (Meredith & Mantel, 2011).  
In the context of the DOD, the situation at the beginning of the twenty first century was 
grim. Harrison (2011) argues, “By almost any measure, the system is broken. Consider this: The 
Defense Department spent at least $46 billion between 2001 and 2011 on a dozen weapons 
systems that never even entered production.”  Additionally, Weisgerber (2014), in an October 
poll by the Government Business Council, Government Executive’s research arm, found that 
more than 25 percent of Defense personnel were not at all confident that the acquisition process 
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provides the military services with the weapons they need; 42 percent were only somewhat 
confident.   
The DOD’s acquisition process is highly complex and does not always produce systems 
that meet estimated cost or performance expectations. Congress has been concerned with the 
structure and performance of the defense acquisition system for many years. For example, the 
House Armed Services Committee’s report of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 Defense Authorization 
Bill states, “Simply put, the Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition process is broken. The 
ability of the Department to conduct the large scale acquisitions required to ensure our future 
national security is a concern of the committee. The rising costs and lengthening schedules of 
major defense acquisition programs lead to more expensive platforms fielded in fewer numbers.” 
(House Report, 2006, p. 350). The committee’s concerns extend to all three key components of 
the acquisition process, including requirements generation, acquisition and contracting, and 
financial management  
Consequently, when critical problems are encountered, the Defense Acquisition Life 
Cycle often cannot be accomplished within the time desirable to deliver the technology needed. 
Changes need to be made in planning the program management process that address critical 
problems with an emphasis on the time available. 
2.1 Modifying Program Management Processes 
Ribbers and Schoo (2002) established that successful programs differentiate their 
approaches according to the extent of the different complexities they encounter. In particular, 
they adjust the number of parallel rollout activities to the static complexity (variety) and organize 
the alignment of Information Technology (IT) and business needs during the parallel activities 
according to the integration needs.  This approach maintains the level of quality while addressing 
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multiple complex processes at the same time.   Ritson, Johansen, and Osbourne (2012) 
concluded that programs have both deliberate and emergent strategies requiring design and 
management to be organized as complex adaptive systems. At the outset, program life-cycle 
phases of design and transition often were formed from an unclear and confusing strategic 
picture, which can make those phases difficult to control.  
Learning was established as an underlying challenge in the process.  A good 
understanding of the problem is needed to ensure a favorable outcome is accomplished. Training 
of the team also is addressed as learning needed to understand who the customer is and what the 
product needs to accomplish in order to be a successful delivery at the end of a program.  
Learning occurs through communication with the customer and reduces the opportunity for 
requirements creep due to a lack of understanding between the program team and the customer.   
Swatloski (2011) describes meetings between the solution providers and the government 
conducted in an open manner with requirements formulated as a problem statement and desired 
outcome; this process facilitates robust communication between solution providers and the 
government so that both gain knowledge for any follow-on acquisition. The key is for 
communication and knowledge transfer to flow in both directions. Openness during the 
development of requirements by the government allows for better articulation of needs and 
solutions prior to the acquisition phase. It usually results in a better match of capability to desired 
outcome, thereby improving the potential solutions. Better potential solutions and knowledge 
transfer lower acquisition risk. 
In addition, literature was reviewed that addresses how changes to the process can be 
implemented in an organization as large as the Department of Defense or as small as a program 
management team.  Turco (2011), an associate administrator of the government-wide policy at 
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the General Services Administration, describes ways to ensure effective change management. 
Turco states the most significant obstacle is humanity because our nature is to avoid change 
rather than embrace it. Senior managers must be aligned across the organization to ensure that all 
are in lockstep on change management. Otherwise, the transition is doomed from the beginning. 
Employees must see that senior management is leading and embracing the change efforts. 
Generally, funding for change management is the first item cut from the budget, yet it has the 
greatest impact for derailing the new technology or process implementation.    
Jordan Sims (2015), the director of organization relations and programs for the Project 
Management Institute, notes that the DoD and federal acquisition have had their share of 
program challenges over the years. In particular, they are confronted with the need to cohesively 
blend the skill sets required for effective program delivery and outcomes. Unfortunately, 
acquisition programs often lack a consistent adherence to sound program management (PM) 
frameworks; instead, they rely on ad-hoc practices and training measures based on a checklist 
mindset.  
To change that way of doing things, there must be a way to adopt a culture that values the 
fundamentals of PM and allows the acquisition workforce to not only effectively manage each 
program based on its unique needs, but also to actually lead them to success.  Secretary of 
Defense Frank Kendall's intent to shift the focus of the acquisition mindset in the DoD from one 
of simple compliance towards one of effective program management for sound program 
structures remains highly encouraging when considered with the rare consensus of legislative 
agreement to codify the effort going forward. One promising improvement in organizational 
acquisition processes focuses on one specific area; developing a more rigorous pre-process phase 
certainly could help stem the tide of cost growth on future government developments. The pre-
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process phase represents the activities and deliverables that occur prior to the program entering 
the execution phase. One technique to counteract the forces that underestimate cost, schedule, 
and performance and muffles bad news is to develop a comprehensive user communication plan 
early in the pre-process phase (Meier, 2008). 
2.2 Crisis situations   
A number of processes need to be considered during problem solving in crisis situations.  
For example, Gal (1991) notes the importance of systematic, cognitive processes for problem 
solving.  Other important factors that should be considered are the complexity of the 
collaborative aspect of the planning process (Mussoni et al., 2016) and multi-criteria 
combinatorial optimization (Dutot et al., 2009).  Horvitz and Barry (1995) describe methods for 
managing the complexity of information needed to simultaneously develop Courses of Action 
(COA) and continuing to monitor the group discussions.   
Cohen’s (2008) research addresses decisions that must be made under pressure and in 
conditions of uncertainty. Cohen argues that such uncertainty is an inherent result of the lack of 
information with regard to the scope of the decision and the probability of the occurrence of 
various results reached by making a specific decision. He continues his observation stating that 
immediate decisions have two advantages: uncertainties are resolved at an early stage, so 
decision makers no longer have to worry about them; secondly, if there is a difference between 
the time of resolution and the actual time of the consequences, decision makers can prepare to 
apply the decisions in the best possible way. However, immediate decisions suffer from a basic 
inadequacy; they are usually based on imperfect knowledge of the future. Where decisions are 
delayed, fewer gaps in information exist, so there is an improved perception of the future 
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objective value. The time needed and the level of the crises are risks that have to be mitigated 
and integrated into the program management process.  
Boyd (1996) addresses the problem solving process and the need to eliminate steps in the 
process. Boyd created the process known as the OODA Loop consisting of the following four 
steps: 
1. Observation: take in observations of the overall situation 
2. Orientation: make judgments of the situation to understand what it means 
3. Decision: transition from gathering information to acting on it 
4. Action: execute and monitor the decision 
A basic strategy is referred to as “getting inside his OODA loop” (Mckay, 2014) by 
executing one’s OODA loops faster than the competitor can. In that situation, competitors fall 
behind in their understanding of the situation, make decisions based upon old, inaccurate 
situation assessments, and become ineffective. Simply increasing the rate of decision-making is 
not sufficient to achieve this goal. The decisions also must be timely and appropriate to achieve 
the desired effect. Fewer steps shorten the time needed to make a qualitative solution. When 
optimizing work as a function of time, completing a job is useless unless it meets its deadline. It 
is thus feasible to reject certain tasks in order to circumvent the time constraint. In this case, the 
number of rejected jobs and their associated costs can be optimized (Dutot et al. 2009). 
2.3 Summary 
In summary, the literature suggests the DALC process success has been declining. 
Continued use of an acquisition cycle that is unable to change and adapt is ineffective. Thus, the 
motivation for this work is to recommend changes to the DALC process to support the 
accelerating change of the requirements in today’s acquisition world. The literature has shown 
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that the complexity of the DALC process continues to grow even as the time to develop and 
deliver quality solutions shrinks in today’s fast-paced, complex DOD role across the world. This 
complexity has resulted in millions of dollars being wasted and programs unable to deliver 
solutions needed to the warfighter.  Program management has to be able to adjust to today’s 
speed of development, and changes are needed to support solving problems in crisis situations. 
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3. 
Method 
 Action Research is a combination of practice and theory, accomplishing practical changes 
in current processes while continueing to achieve research goals.  Knowledge gained during 
research is directly applied to current problems and new solutions are developed in real time. 
3.1 Action Research 
There are many definitions of action research. One of the most widely cited is Rapoport’s, 
which states, “Action research aims to contribute both to the practical concerns of people in an 
immediate problematic situation and to the goals of social science by joint collaboration within a 
mutually acceptable ethical framework” (1970, p. 499). 
The use of action research as a methodology for this dissertation is to bring about change in 
the DALC process used by the military.  The research is aimed at increasing understanding of the 
challenge in the DALC process then using this understanding to propose a feasible, effective 
improvement to the process. As an officer overseeing research and development in a national 
laboratory that supports the work of the military, I have observed the results of using the action 
research methodology and have implemented changes that improved our ability to accomplish 
DALC processes. 
Blum (1995) explains the essence of action research is a two-stage process. First, the 
diagnostic stage involves a collaborative analysis of the social situation by the researcher and the 
stakeholders in that situation. Second, the therapeutic stage involves collaborative change 
experiments. In this stage, changes are introduced and the effects are studied. 
However, to achieve scientific rigor, additional structure is usually imposed on action 
research. The most prevalent description by Susman and Evered (1978) details five phases that, 
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together, form a cyclical process (Figure 2). This process can be considered as an “ideal” 
(Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003) exemplar of the original formulation of action research. In practice, 
the application of the process may vary. In Susman and Evered’s approach, first a client-system 
infrastructure or research environment is established. Then, the following five phases are 
implemented. 
The first phase is diagnosing. It is important to remember that the goal of an action research 
project is to make things better, improve some specific practice, or correct something not 
working as well as it should (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003). During the diagnostic phase, the goal is 
to get to the root cause of the problem. Often, multiple problems need to be addressed. 
Techniques such as fishbone diagrams can be used to understand root causations and aid in the 
identification of the problems. 
The second phase is action planning. During this phase, a detailed plan of action is 
developed. The plan includes how changes to the process will be made, who will be in charge of 
implementing the changes, and when the changes will be introduced into the process. The plan 
also includes monitoring the changes to ensure a positive impact is being made.  
The third phase is action taking. Implementing the plan may not be as straightforward as it 
appeared during the planning phase. Consequently, changes may have to be made to the plan. 
These changes and their justification have to be captured. Thus, it is likely that during the action 
taking phase, new understanding will be gained that can be incorporated into future process 
changes. 
The fourth phase is evaluating. Detailed observations, monitoring, and recording lessons 
learned allow the researcher to assess the impacts and effectiveness of the process changes. All 
stakeholders involved in the action research program need to maintain documentation of the 
18 
 
impacts the changes have made on the program and their ability to complete their tasks 
successfully. Additional observations and insights deemed relevant should be captured and 
discussed as well. 
The fifth phase is specifying learning. Regular meetings among the stakeholders involved 
are an essential piece of an action research project. Changes to the interventions can be made as 
the project proceeds if stakeholders meet on a regular basis. At the end of a project, it is vital to 
review what has happened with lessons learned and stakeholders’ observations by using an 
action cycle for process improvement. Questions need to be asked, such as how effective were 
the changes and what learnings could be extracted. Learning is captured within team discussions 
where ideas can be shared. Improvements in the processes are likely to arise and may inform 
further action research cycles.  
3.2 Setting 
3.2.1 Research Laboratory 
The Research Laboratory utilized for this dissertation is a non-profit laboratory with an 
offsite office in St. Petersburg, Florida, with 37 employees. The primary focus of the laboratory 
is research and development of technology for national security and space.  It facilitates group 
decisions made in crisis situations.  Annually, 6 to 10 national security type programs that 
involve critical time sensitive problems are made in affiliation with the lab. Decisions are made 
by laboratory internal staff, government user groups, and Subject Matter Experts (SME) from 
outside sources.   
Laboratory staff is comprised of The Program Manager (PM) and the Technical Director 
(TD).  The PM is responsible for the overall technical development of the system, oversees the 
design, and analyzes the system and system elements required for production, integration, test, 
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deployment, support, operation, and disposal. The PM works with the user to document 
performance and sustainment requirements in specifying objective outcomes, measures, and 
resource commitments.  The TD is responsible for developing the engineering plan and applying 
the processes across the program, monitoring execution throughout the program, and taking 
necessary steps to improve process efficiency and effectiveness. 
The government user is the client of the lab who has requested support to solve a critical 
time sensitive problem.  The laboratory takes the actions described below to ensure the best 
support possible is available to the client when a critical time sensitive problem occurs.  For 
point of presence, the Laboratory has invested a large amount of money to build a 20,000 square 
foot facility with engineering, meeting, and secure space near the United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM).  
A Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with both commands provides 
the government personnel, facilities, equipment, or other resources with or without 
reimbursement for development efforts that are consistent with the mission of the laboratory. 
CRADAs are authorized by 15 U.S.C. 3710a. The governing regulation is AR 70-57, Military-
Civilian Technology Transfer, dated February 26, 2004. Additionally, the laboratory has an 
indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract. This type of contract provides an 
indefinite quantity of supplies or services during a fixed period.   
As a veteran with 25 years of military service and the PM for these programs, I have a 
stake in developing new processes that provide timely, decisive problem solving in a shortened 
period. These preparatory actions follow the Principal of Research-Client Agreement (Davison et 
al., 2004).  
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3.2.2 Processes and Teams 
The setting described here relates the atmosphere experienced by the unit members and 
the experts involved in the DALC process for developing solutions to requirements. As discussed 
before, the three distinct DALC process activities are: the pre-process, the execution process, and 
the post-activities process.  All of these are limited by the time available. 
The Pre-Process for a laboratory team traditionally begins when a capability gap is 
identified.  The team has to be assembled and updated on the technical issues associated with the 
capability gap. The team must develop a working relationship with military commands and the 
units in the command that are affected by the capability gap. If the gap is enduring, it becomes a 
requirement and the laboratory team can understand the solution needs in order to solve the 
problem. It is crucial that the team also becomes familiar with the equipment the units have and 
how the equipment is employed.  The execution process begins when a deployed unit presents a 
description of a mission failure. The post-process has several deliverables.  First and foremost, 
the working hardware or software solution the team has developed is examined. Additionally, 
several written reports are produced. For example, the After Action Report (AAR) is published.   
 The Operations Officer (OF), who plans, coordinates, and integrates operations, is 
located in the Operations Center (OC). The OC is a command post for military operations, which 
is staffed by a small group of specially trained officers or military personnel who guide members 
of an active tactical element during a mission. The operations team is briefed by the unit on the 
circumstances and the estimated amount of time available to develop a solution.  This period is 
generally driven by staff assessments of the next potential window to execute the mission.   
The operations team then proceeds to identify a team of interdisciplinary Subject Matter 
Experts (SME) who will be briefed on the problem. The experts selected are comprised of a mix 
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of generalists and specialists, with varied technical backgrounds and training.  All SMEs have 
proven their abilities as evidenced from past performance and are leaders in their perspective 
fields. Each SME significantly impacts team performance; having the right people with the right 
skills leads to greater efficiency and effectiveness.  
The purpose in gathering SMEs is to create a group of SMEs with the explicit intent of 
being part of a problem solving team. The SMEs are from federally funded research and 
development centers (FFRDC), which are unique entities sponsored and funded by the U.S. 
government to meet specific long-term technical needs that cannot be met by any other single 
organization.  SMEs are also from University Affiliated Research Centers (UARC), which are 
strategic United States Department of Defense (DoD) research programs associated with a 
university. UARCs are university-led collaborations between different entities: universities, 
industry and Army laboratories (conducting basic, applied, and technology-demonstration 
research), not-for-profit research and development organizations (specializing in the design, 
development, and deployment of advanced technology solutions to problems in national 
security), and sometimes, select commercial industry engineers. 
The role and architecture of the independent SME organization:  
 The team of experts assembled is highly centralized. Its purpose is to focus on new 
technology and facilitate communication and integration with the participants across the different 
functional groups of which it is comprised. These temporary teams are autonomous from their 
parent organizations in terms of management. However, they maintain the ability to reach back 
to their parent organization for additional development support.   
Tools  
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 The SME team is focused on developing highly novel technologies. Their methods 
involve a combination of rational thinking alongside intuition-based thought. The intent is to take 
advantage of the intuitive reasoning from the individuals on the ground and combine it with the 
logical rational approach of engineers. To facilitate innovation and creativity, the group is 
provided a room designed to facilitate cooperative thinking.  
Understanding the requirement  
 The SME team is briefed by the military leader from the unit. The leader shares his/her 
assessment of what transpired, what (s) he believes the requirement is, and what needs to happen 
next in order to be successful.  The SME team’s  role is to listen to the brief from the military 
team leader, ask questions, and identify the gaps in the available technology that prevented the 
operation from being successful. These gaps result in a new requirement being developed. 
Second, the SMEs develop possible solutions and evaluate the solutions’ effectiveness, 
operational suitability, and estimated Life-Cycle Cost (LLC) to meet the mission requirements. 
When necessary, small groups meet in breakout rooms and further refine their solutions.  
Third, detailed plans are created to describe the project’s overall technical approach, 
including key technical risks, processes, resources, and metrics. The OF staff is responsible for 
approving the solution and authorizing it to be executed. In some cases, the OF staff sends the 
solutions back and requests additional information to be provided before authorizing.   
Finally, after approving the plans, a specific time-based schedule is developed, showing all 
detailed tasks required to accomplish the work effort. This schedule is a systematic approach to 
planning, scheduling, and execution.  The plan also accounts for the amount of time available 
before the solution is needed.   
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The post-process has several deliverables.  First and foremost, the working hardware or 
software solution the team has developed is examined. Additionally, several written reports are 
produced. Finally, an After Action Report (AAR) is prepared and published.  
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4. 
Results 
4.1  Applied Action Research  
 The DALC process is not rapid or responsive to targeted defense technology and has 
proven to be too long for the time available to support the rapid turn time needed as 
demonstrated through a multitude of failures to meet time available. The military cannot delay 
missions and allow persistent requirements to exist. The DALC 
process continues to erode battlefield advantages, intelligence 
advantages, and overall defensive leverage.  As an example, 
and a consequence of these DALC approaches, teams leverage 
a series of no-cost extensions, which prove to be very 
unfavorable for all parties involved.  First, the customer must 
wait longer for the desired product.  Second, the performing 
organization receives no additional funding to complete the originally proposed task.  Finally, 
and possibly most damaging, the repeated requests for extensions implant a perception (whether 
fair or not) that either the performing organization (or contractor performing the development 
work) is unable to plan and manage a project or the performing organization is not equipped to 
complete the proposed development activity.   
Requesting an extension, even without funding, is considered a breach of contract since 
work performed is bound by cost and schedule.  Customers are rated on their management of 
contract performance not only by their ability to meet all technical and cost objectives, but also 
No Cost Extension: a “no cost” 
contract extension is a bilateral 
contract modification executed by 
the customer that lengthens the 
contract period of performance 
with no increase in the overall 
estimated cost of the contract, the 
fixed fee of the contract, and the 
funds obligated to the contract as 
specified in the contract schedule 
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by delivery within or before the end of the period of performance.  Any delays or cost overruns 
are perceived throughout the customer management chain as negative and a failure to meet 
contract objectives, thus reflecting poorly on the contractor performing the technical work. 
4.1.1  Diagnosis Phase 
For this study, a diagnosis process was initiated with a team consisting of a program 
manager, a systems engineer and a technical director to discover the root cause of the failures in 
the DALC process.  For the purpose of this evaluation, the definition of a failure is any scenario 
where the exact letter of the contract deliverables was not met.  While some failures may have 
less serious consequences than others, all schedule extensions resulting in a no cost extension, 
deliverables not functioning as specified, program costs exceeding contract value and any other 
situation that results in not meeting the specified deliverable elements of the contract both on 
time and on budget are considered a failure.  
The diagnosis process encompassed reviewing the overall cost, schedule, technical 
approach, and risk management plan as compiled at the beginning of the program, evaluating the 
program performance against the projected plan, and evaluating the successes and failures of 
each deliverable item against the customer’s requirements.  This review focused on the time 
needed to complete the program compared to the time available.  
A Fishbone (Ishikawa) Diagram (Figure 3) was used to identify the cause of the program 
not meeting the contractual deliverables, schedule, and cost. The Fishbone Diagram technique 
was used because it quickly sorts ideas into useful categories.  The process started with the 
requirement statement written on a wall with a box drawn around it. Then, a line was drawn 
horizontally across the board to the box. Then, the team began to identify all the possible causes 
of the failures, which were drawn on the wall as branches to the main line. Then, each branch 
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was addressed by asking, “Why does this happen?” As causes were identified, they were added. 
This process continued until all possible causes were identified. 
 
    Figure 2: Fishbone Diagram Example  
4.1.1.1  Results of diagnosis #1: Beyond First Order Risk Management 
After completing a review of seven programs (see Figure 5, Kinetic Problem Solving 
Matrix), the full risk identification process, including the root 
identification of failures and corresponding risk mitigation 
plans, were not fully understood and developed until the end of 
the program. Consequently, managing and overcoming the 
risks was costly in consequence to the development effort. 
This led to the idea that the entire risk management plan was 
insufficient, too superficial, and not pursued to the depth 
required at an early enough stage in the development process 
to be of any more value beyond a post mortem exercise to the development team. 
First Order Effect: Direct 
consequence of an action 
Second Order Effect: A second 
consequence resulting on a non-
contiguous component from a 
direct first order effect 
Third Order Effect: An additional 
consequence (tertiary effect) 
resulting from the consequence of 
the second order effect 
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The analysis of lessons learned from several programs showed that the top-level risks 
identified (among others) the actual risk factor that led to the delay or ultimate failure of the 
development efforts. Details for the lessons learned summary analysis are shown in Appendix 2: 
Lessons Learned by Program.  To address these shortcomings in the risk management plan, the 
key element missing was the depth of expertise and emphasis on driving to root cause analysis.  
The existing process had proven highly effective in a first order identification of the key risk 
elements for the programs.   
Analysis using a Tertiary Effects on the Development (Figure 4) model that first and 
second order identification of the risk areas were accomplished, but further analysis of third 
order impacts were not addressed. This led to delays, cost overruns, and even failures in the 
course of performing development activities.  The second order analysis examined the potential 
outcomes of choices that could be made during the early stage of the program and how they may 
affect related components. The third order analysis, the “Compatibility Test,” went back one step 
further to examine the end target device and how certain components, designs, or choices may 
impact the end user of the device or system based on the known risk elements. 
The first change needed was to identify deeper technical experts who could more fully 
understand the nuances of the risk area before designs were initiated, parts were ordered, and 
budget expended to drive to a solution.  Technical experts with a deep understanding and past 
performance in exact or closely related risk elements are the first key to a deeper, second order 
analysis. These technical experts can be identified through past performance information 
available through database queries, inquiries into work performed by specific vendors who 
provide technology capabilities, or relationships that enable access to non-public information, 
such as national laboratories, special industrial partnerships, academic institutions, or 
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professional organizations. The expert must take the top level risk items and break down all 
adjacent and adjoining repercussions that can occur if a certain risk mitigation, assumption, or 
avoidance is employed.   
 
   Figure 3: Tertiary Effects on the Development 
The team dealt with a painful example of this second and third order effect from Program 
1 (Appendix 2: Lessons Learned by Program).  Program 1 focused on the development of a new 
hardware device with a custom power source.  The program would take an existing commercial 
battery and replace it in the target system with a smaller battery that would allow additional 
features to be developed for advanced capabilities.  All members of the Program 1 team 
expressed concerns about this battery technology but were assured by the customer that SMEs 
were available to help the team at any time along with a large repository of technical data on how 
the commercial battery performed.  The team was not able to find an appropriate battery in the 
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correct size range to replace the standard system battery, so the decision was made to develop a 
custom battery through a well-known battery research and development group.   
While developing a custom battery, the team encountered many challenges, including a 
challenging set of electrical designs and long delays from the battery research group developing 
the custom sized battery.  The team had identified one second order effect that needed to be 
accounted for on the battery, which was to utilize a small voltage up-converter/down-converter 
board because there was a difference in operating voltage.  This turned out to be a very important 
risk identification and mitigation later because the system would never work with the voltage 
mismatch.   
Finally, in month seven of the originally six month development effort, the team received 
the first batteries from the research team and began to integrate the batteries into the newly 
developed system.  When the team turned the system on, nothing happened.  In all simulations, 
the new electronics had worked very well.  The effort had taken much longer and was over 
budget, but all the preliminary models worked correctly.  After a few more weeks, an additional 
electrical engineer was asked to assist with evaluating why the final system would not boot up.  
After additional testing, it was found that the system required a much larger instantaneous power 
draw than had been anticipated.  This need is very analogous to a residential air conditioning 
system, which requires a large surge of power to start and a much lower constant power to keep 
running.  The customized battery cell could not provide this instantaneous power draw to boot up 
the system.   
This battery power start up example can be identified clearly as a second order effect that 
the development team did not understand.  The customer SMEs did not provide any regular 
technical reviews throughout the program. Thus, there was no opportunity for the information to 
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surface earlier in the program.  Program 1 was nearly three months late and more than 20% over 
budget when the discovery was made.  A fallback battery solution had been discovered during 
the scramble to uncover the system start up power issue, but at that point, the customer was too 
dismayed with the overall Program 1 progress and abandoned the effort. 
4.1.1.2  Results of diagnosis #2: Scope Creep and Expectation Management 
Another major category of failure had little to do with the actual technology or 
requirement developed on contract.  This failure was a 
combination of scope creep and expectations 
management.  In the case of Program 2 (Appendix 2: 
Lessons Learned by Program), the team was performing 
a technical refresh of a customized hardware system.  
The original statement of work was very clearly written.  
The program included a redesign of the original system 
but maintained all of the same basic functionality.  The 
new system would have new hardware components that 
mirrored the basic capability of the previous system with a focus on size and power reduction of 
the new system.  The original statement of work listed 10 clearly defined new features that 
would be developed as a part of the new system, including a brand-new user interface to the 
system.   
As a part of the Program 2 development, the prime contractor was directed to use a 
subcontractor for the software development with which the customer had an existing, on-going 
relationship.  To the naivety of the prime contractor team, the pre-existing relationship between 
the subcontractor and the customer would open a large, undocumented set of new features and 
Scope Creep: The addition of new 
features, capabilities or even 
requirements beyond the original 
statement of work; these are 
typically not well documented, if at 
all, but become a part of the 
‘expected’ deliverable 
Expectations Management: 
Allowing the customer to perceive 
one reality while working towards 
another reality; excessive 
undocumented features through 
scope creep can lead to disconnect 
in final deliverable expectations 
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capabilities that could be slipped into the software.  Almost all of the communication about these 
undocumented features were established through back channel communications the prime 
contractor was not aware of and was never informed of until much later in the program.   
Unbeknownst to the prime contractor, at roughly six months into the 12 month program, 
the subcontractor began to request additional funding beyond the amount agreed to in the 
original subcontract agreement.  At this time, the prime contractor became aware of the creep in 
scope that the subcontractor and customer had colluded on.  After many heated discussions and 
negotiations, the subcontractor quit the program.  However, at this point, the damage to 
expectations had been ingrained into the customer team, including a belief that dozens of 
additional capabilities could be inserted into the software at no additional cost to the program 
while the base software and documented features were being constructed.     
4.1.1.3  Results of diagnosis #3: Iterative Parallelization 
Possibly, the single biggest challenge to the DALC process is sequential waterfall 
development approach, which is the ability to increase speed and reduce schedule.  Inherently, 
and by design, a waterfall program is structured to manage risk by completing each task before 
diving into the next task.  There have been attempts to create ‘mini-projects’ within a larger 
waterfall program that creates a series of smaller waterfalls.  However, the additional overhead 
and management burden and costs from running these additional programs remain.   
During the execution of Program 3 (Appendix 2: Lessons Learned by Program), our team 
discovered how challenging the completion of a waterfall style program can be under tight 
schedule and budget constraints.  The goal of Program 3 was to develop new technology 
demonstrations, including a conceptual design, performance modeling, prototype build and 
assembly, and a unit test to validate the expected performance of each system.  Program 3 was 
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initiated under a traditional waterfall approach by an experienced program manager who laid out 
a 12 month schedule.  The plan was to have two engineers work on the first demonstration unit 
from start to finish, then the second and finally the third.  Six months into Program 3, the team 
was approximately halfway done with the first demonstration build and almost no work had been 
initiated on the other two demonstrations.  At this point, a new task leader was assigned to the 
effort and a re-evaluation of the program was made.   
With nearly half of the funding spent and only six months remaining in the program, 
there were two choices.  Either the company could add more funds and allow parallel teams to 
tackle the next two demonstration units or return to the customer and request that at least one of 
the three demonstrations be de-scoped from the program.  Those within the company decided to 
absorb the additional cost and parallelize the efforts.  Over the next six months, an additional 
engineer was added to the first task, and the team completed the first demonstration within a 
month.  A second team at another facility began work and completed the second demonstration 
unit in less than four months.  The first team then began work on the third demonstration unit.  
Through several long weekends and late nights at work, the first team finally completed the third 
demonstration unit successfully, and the system met or exceeded every performance parameter.  
The second system built at another facility also turned out to be a huge success and led to another 
large development effort to mature this program.  However, the late adjustment to parallelize this 
program proved costly, and the company had to absorb a nearly 15% cost overrun on the 
program.   
Quite possibly, the most beneficial aspect of this experience was the new concept of 
parallelization of tasking to compress schedule.  In the lessons learned for Program 3, the status 
of the program at the six month mark caused great concern among management because were it 
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not for the adjustment to a parallel execution of demonstration units, the program would have 
been completed with a cost overrun and incomplete deliverables and required a no cost 
extension. 
4.1.2  Action Planning Phase 
During this phase, a detailed plan of action is developed to address each of the results 
discovered during the Diagnosis Phase.  
Result #1: Beyond First Order Risk Management, Program 8 (see Figure 5) was selected 
and a plan developed to introduce Risk Mitigation Compatibility Testing. Technical experts were 
identified who understood the risk area of this specific technology before designs were initiated, 
parts were ordered, and budget expended to drive to a solution.  The technical experts had past 
performance in exact or closely related risk elements, which was a requirement.  The expert 
needed to take the top-level risk items and break down all adjacent and adjoining repercussions 
that could occur if a certain risk mitigation, assumption, or avoidance was employed. They 
conducted regular project risk mitigation plans “Compatibility Test,” ensuring that they were 
well-matched with the overall program system. The technical director monitored the changes to 
ensure a positive impact was being made. 
Result #2: Scope Creep and Expectation Management, Program 9 (see Figure 5) was the 
next program selected.  The plan identified meeting between the laboratory and the government 
to identify requirements early and lock them in. Communication between the program manager 
and the government was a critical part of the plan. Managing the expectations in the beginning 
and having defined requirements reduced the impact on the program schedule. 
Result #3: Iterative Parallelization, Program 10 (see Figure 5) was the first to have 
parallelization used within the DALC process.  By design, the DALC process is a waterfall  
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K = Kinetic Process  
   
   
Figure 4: Kinetic Problem Solving Matrix 
 
program. The structure is meant to manage risk by completing each task before moving 
to the next.  The Iterative Parallelization plan had engineers trained in parallel processes 
participate in the initial work breakdown scheduling and identify hardware and software 
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schedules that could run in parallel without impacting each other or the program.  Identifying 
efforts that could run in parallel instead of making mini projects reduced the need of additional 
overhead and management costs from running these additional programs, which saved time and 
money.   
4.1.3  Action taking phase  
Each of the changes to the DALC process addressed above were implemented iteratively 
for each program; the changes required additional management oversight in the beginning.  
Checklists had to be changed to incorporate additional steps, and teams had to ensure nothing 
was overlooked. Each team member documented any changes to the plan as well as why the 
changes were made.  
4.1.4  Evaluating phase 
Assessments of the impacts and the effectiveness of the process change were captured for 
each program. All team members maintained documentation of the impacts that the changes 
made on the programs as well as on their ability to complete tasks. Lessons learned from each of 
the programs were documented; additional meetings were held to discuss the impact of each 
change.   
4.1.5  Specifying learning phase 
During the evaluation phase, program 10 (which had the Iterative Parallelization change 
applied) still ran past the time available (see Figure 5, Kinetic Problem Solving Matrix). The 
cause for running past available time was identified as a lack of a compatibility test. The risk 
mitigation plans developed for the multiple runs that were executed in parallel were seen as a 
single risk. The DALC risk mitigation did not capture the impact of simultaneous sprints on the 
same assembly.  Programs 8 and 9 performed perfectly and were completed on time and within 
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the budget.  It was decided to develop a new action plan that incorporated all three changes into a 
single plan. 
4.2  A New Process 
 The new Kinetic Problem Solving process is focused on efficient, effective program 
management.  The dominant challenge faced in almost all situations encountered, whether cost 
overruns, deliverables not meeting expectations, or contract extensions, involve program 
management.  The new process described by this in-depth study of 20 example programs 
spanning more than five years involves some aspects of Agile program management and custom 
process steps that tailor to the efficiencies and effectiveness required for the unique 
developmental needs of defense technologies.  The new process can be broken down into five 
top level categories, none of which is particularly new or novel concepts.  However, the focus, 
emphasis, communication, and continuous learning employed to ensure that success or failure 
can be achieved more rapidly is new.  The five top level categories are: 
1. Preliminary Planning 
2. Fast Start 
3. Program Tracking 
4. Milestones/Delivery 
5. Lessons Learned/Implementation 
The application of the new process addresses the three results discovered in chapter 4.1.1 
(Diagnosis Phase). The three results were: 1) Looking Beyond First Order Risk Management 
where the reason for failure is addressed by ensuring the risk mitigation plan is compatible with 
the entire system; 2) Scope Creep and Expectation Management, which is part of the tracking 
process and accomplished with constant communication with the customer; and, 3)  Iterative 
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Parallelization, which is introduced in the development of the Integrated Master Schedule by the 
program manager and task leaders to increase the speed and meet the time allocation 
requirements.  The new processes are covered in more detail in the following sections. 
4.3  Preliminary Planning 
 Too often in contracting work, nothing occurs before the official program start due to a 
variety of factors, including funding, lack of information, or simply permission or authorization 
to proceed.  To effectively execute programs faster and drive to required conclusion or critical 
milestone, barriers to start must be removed and an effective plan must be developed in advance.  
The next section discusses how to begin the program more quickly.  Specifically, the section is 
dedicated to the steps that can be pre-planned before an effort is conceived.  Many steps in a 
program life cycle are pre-defined and can be setup in advance as a cut-out or template for future 
programs.  In addition, pre-planning decision trees can be established to streamline the steps to 
drive quickly to actual program work. 
4.3.1  Pre-planning 
 Every organization has a set of steps (some common to any company and some unique to 
a company) that must be completed to financially and legally execute work.  Additional items 
simply do not require waiting until a new program has started to setup the framework for specific 
activities.  Figure 6 shows a sample of pre-program and program start-up activities.  This 
framework of activities can be used to enable the Fast Start discussed in the next section.  
Another key step in the pre-planning stage is ensuring that staff members are identified to 
handle individual tasks and coordinate overall fast start execution.  These team members must be 
prioritized so that they can be transitioned to these activities quickly and without excessive 
delays. Additionally, these members must have an in-depth understanding of the customer, the 
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customer’s equipment, and how the equipment is used.  An organization must commit the 
resources and make it a top priority to focus its limited set of people, dollars, and capabilities on 
achieving these objectives.  Investment in pre-planning in advance of program execution is a key 
success factor in driving time management and overall success of rapid response missions. 
No. Action Item Title Description Owner Date Assigned
Expected 
Completion 
Date
Actual 
Completion 
Date Priority Comments Status
1 Deliverables/milestones
2 Customer requirements
3 Risk Management
4 Staffing plan
5 Budget
6 Identify suppliers
7 Task plans/estimates
8 Internal kick off scheduled
9 Generate internal kick off slides
10 Internal kick off slides in DMIN
11 Request project #s
12 Request project collaboration site
13 Request project folders
14 Request document numbers
15 Generate doc number tracker
16 External kick off scheduled
17 Generate external kick off slides
18
External kick off slides place in 
configuration management (CM)
19
Determine hardware manufacturing 
level (HML)
20
Determine Technology Readiness 
Level (TRL) 
21 Complete program tailoring checklist
22 Complete program plan
23
Engineering Change Request (ECR) 
program plan
24
Complete engineering tailoring 
checklist
25 Complete engineering plan
26 ECR engineering plan
27 Document tree
28 Work breakdown structure (WBS)
29 Schedule
30 Develop performance metrics
31 Hardware development checklist
32 Electronics packaging checklist
33 Electronic design checklist
34 High level block diagram (system)
35
System level Interface Control 
Document (ICD)
36 Electronics block diagram
37 Subsystem(s) level ICD  
Figure 5: Pre-planning Program Activities 
 The key points in pre-planning are not necessarily the specific activities but rather that 
each company or team develops, in advance, the steps or key factors required to reach an end 
objective.  The goal is to complete activities sooner, ensure that steps are not missed, and better 
inform the team members so that expectations about requirements are met.  Many of the items 
for which a team must pre-plan are for internal use or processes only; they may never be seen or 
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reported to the customer.  However, having all these items identified in advance and developing 
a plan that will achieve each step in a timely manner is essential to rapidly meeting objectives. 
4.3.2  Decision Trees 
 Another important step in the pre-planning process is better understanding the variable 
factors that may affect every step that needs to be executed in the fast start step of the new 
process discussed later in this chapter. Decision trees are used as a predictive tool to visualize 
observations and data and develop the type of programs for which the current situation calls 
(Figure 7). A simple example might be to define the type of program that needs to be executed, 
such as: 
 Systems integration 
 Mission planning 
 Hardware development 
 Software only 
 Hardware and software development with system integration   
These are just a few of the types of programs that may be encountered by the team.   
 Another important aspect of pre-planning is defining the maturity of the technology 
needed to meet the threshold of the requirement.  In some instances, a basic, functional prototype 
unit may be sufficient whereas, in other cases, a device that is fully documented, reproducible 
and ready for a larger scale production is required.  Understanding the complexity of the 
capability needs to be developed to meet the requirement may dramatically affect the quantity 
and quality of steps required to achieve the end goals. 
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Figure 6: Decision Tree 
 
4.4  Fast Start 
 The fast start in the process heavily leverages the pre-planning steps in the new process.  
The fast start is the execution of the pre-planning steps and is only as effective as the rigor 
behind the pre-planning.  If the pre-planning is not detailed enough or does not truly encompass 
the required steps, then starting faster can cause missed steps, rework, or failures just from the 
rapid nature of accelerating the overall process cycle time and schedule. 
To achieve rapid execution of tasks, the program requires having the correct staff with 
the right focus, direction, and skills to complete tasks.  In pre-planning, staff members best suited 
to rapid execution of tasks should be identified and in a stand-by or ready call-up state to enable 
rapid deployment to a new program.  In fast mission response activities, having the correct 
personnel resourced and ready quickly may be the single biggest limiting factor to achieving 
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success.  The good news is this set of resources may be the easiest to allocate when upper 
management provides the correct leadership and motivation to establish the battle rhythm for this 
type of resource commitment.  
Risk management is addressed in this process, and the Risk Mitigation Plan is tested to 
ensure it is compatible with the system as a whole and will not harm other processes and 
jeopardize the program.  
4.5  Program Tracking 
 Program tracking is a long neglected activity in many organizations.  The needed tracking 
is multi-faceted and includes financial, schedule, milestone, and technical progress tracking and 
reporting.  In previous lessons learned, many examples of activity and performance tracking 
were collected but not properly reported.  It is imperative that stakeholders and team members 
are informed regularly and accurately about overall program metrics and progress.   
4.5.1  Risk Management Tracking 
 A very important part of program tracking is risk management. Risk management 
tracking begins in the pre-planning stage when risk management processes are established and 
staff are trained on the use of the risk compatibility test.  Risk items need to be tracked during the 
fast start of the program.  As discussed in the evaluating phase, the risks need to be evaluated for 
first, second, and third order effects, which may include the employment of experts external to 
the team and possibly to the company or organization.  The risk management system is 
responsible for the entire risk process, including the deeper analysis piece for second and third 
order effects on the program and the customer deliverables. Scope Creep and Expectation 
Management are handled in this process.  Constant communication is required to ensure the 
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customer is clear on where the program is heading.  A change in scope can cause a contractual 
modification that impacts the time needed to complete the program. 
4.5.2  Integrated Master Schedule 
 The overall program schedule is a key thread through the new process.  First, templates, 
metrics, and processes to track program elements and milestone progress can be established in 
advance of the program.  During the fast start of the program, the program elements, timeline, 
and milestones should be established within the program schedule.  Program managers and task 
leaders incorporate iterative parallelization during the development of the integrated master 
schedule (see Figure 8); all team members should use the program schedule as a planning guide 
to ensure that activities are addressed in a timely manner.  Designated leaders should be assigned 
the responsibility of both tracking activities and ensuring that updates are regularly 
communicated to the team and stakeholders.  
 
Figure 7: Integrated Master Schedule 
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4.5.3  Program Financials 
 The second key piece of program tracking is the regular financial updates.  An important 
aspect of the financial tracking that needs to be established in the pre-planning stage is the 
assurance of a comprehensive financial tracking system that should include all costs that will be 
charged against the program budget, including fees, cost centers, taxes, labor, materials, travel 
costs, etc. (see Figure 9).  During the program’s financial tracking, the responsible tracking staff 
member must be able to gain access to all financial data affecting the program.  Equally 
important is the control of the budget funding for release to specified activities.  A breakdown in 
financial tracking from untracked costs or unapproved or miscommunicated costs can lead to 
cost overruns and create stress or break points on other aspects of the program. 
 A secondary piece of the program financial tracking is clear, concise communication to 
all stakeholders.  Team leadership cannot afford to spend valuable execution time performing 
detailed briefings on every aspect of the budget financial cycle.  However, effective team leaders 
find ways to provide an overview of financial status and dive deeper into potential financial 
trouble spots that may affect the program negatively.  Communication of program financials 
takes experience, finesse, and timely messaging of the truth.  
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Figure 8: Financial Tracking Chart 
4.5.4  Program Technical Progress 
 The third aspect of effective program tracking is the tracking of the program’s technical 
progress, which is the physical progress towards the milestone and objectives. An important 
piece of the technical progress tracking is the reporting and verbiage that describes progress on 
key tasks and identifies issues that are being overcome or need assistance in handling.  The 
program technical progress reporting also informs the details of the risk management tracking.   
A major item that must be contained within technical progress tracking is the red flag.  A 
red flag is simply the alerting process whereby major issues are identified and communicated to 
the team and, if appropriate, to all stakeholders.  A red-flagged item may need to be raised as a 
risk factor.  At a minimum, all red flags must be documented, addressed, and tracked for as long 
as the item persists in the program life cycle.    
45 
 
4.6  Milestones/Deliverables 
 Two major components comprise the definitions of the deliverables and milestones 
needed to meet deliverables.  First, the customer should lead the preparation of the actual 
requirements that define the characteristics of the deliverable item(s).  These requirements need 
to be decomposed into actual work tasks, and the technical complexity of the deliverable should 
be clear in the fast start of the program.  The tracking steps will ensure that the correct levels of 
effort are achieved during the technical development activities.  Effective team leaders ensure 
that regular status is given, not only on the overall program, cost, and schedule, but also on the 
progress towards specific milestones and deliverables.    
Expectation management is an important aspect of the deliverable process that begins in 
pre-planning and continues through the final delivery on a program.  The deliverables must be 
clearly defined and the actual requirements documented.  The deliverables should not be 
modified unless an officially tracked change request is received, costed, and tracked, including 
an assessment to all aspects of the program, especially schedule.   
4.7  Lessons Learned/Implementation 
 As shown in the earlier program examples, lessons learned are an important tool for 
maturing an organization’s ability to deliver products to customers.  Additionally, the lessons 
learned drive process refinement and improvement.  Lessons learned do not necessarily have to 
wait until the end of the program and should be documented and tracked as the items become 
known.  
Based on lessons learned through Programs 1, 2, and 3 in this study, the new action plan 
was first introduced in Program 11 (Appendix 2: Lessons Learned by Program) to overcome and 
prevent failures encountered during the prior program. One significant change was the shift away 
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from a DALC waterfall program management 
approach to a modified DALC with Agile program 
management.  Agile program management is a 
common tool that has been used among software 
developers for many years.  The modified DALC with 
Agile program management method is not exactly 
what was needed to fix these challenges in hardware 
development, but some of the principles form the basis 
for the new paradigm in rapid technology 
development.   
We established the first two tenants in the new paradigm as looking beyond first order 
risk management and managing scope creep/expectation.  The third tenant in the new paradigm 
is iterative parallelization.  The objective in the third tenant is to run as many tasks as possible, 
especially the highest risk tasks, earlier and faster.  Before the contract for the program begins, 
many programmatic tasks can begin and management tools, configuration tools, and program 
planning can be established.  The staffing for the program needs to be prepared in advance and 
available for work the moment a new contract is finalized.   
The beta test was established and executed for Program 11, which coincidentally was the 
significant follow-on effort that arose from one of the three demonstration units completed under 
Program 3.  All programmatic planning, engineering planning, and staffing were prepared in 
advance of the new contract.  The management and technical leadership team spent a great deal 
of time ensuring that all requirements, tasks, and the final deliverables for Program 11 were 
clearly documented in the contract and communicated with the sponsoring division leadership.  
Agile application life cycle 
management, agile process 
management, or simply agile, 
Agile application life cycle 
management (agile ALM) refers to 
the process of using or 
complementing agile development 
techniques within application life 
cycle management. It is a software 
development technique that aims to 
improve a product's quality over 
its life cycle while keeping the 
development time as low as 
possible. 
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The team also employed an agile program management tool called JIRA/Confluence.  This tool 
enabled another aspect of the new paradigm to be better implemented: accountability among all 
team members.  The secret in the waterfall development method is that this technique is 
inherently hierarchical.  All direction flows through the program leader; therefore, leadership 
makes all decisions and the pace of the program is dictated by the speed at which this individual 
or small team of individuals can execute their responsibilities.   
The JIRA/Confluence tool following the agile method pushes more responsibility and 
decision making to the technical workers within bounds defined by leadership in advance.  The 
program and engineering planning established in advance informs design decisions, such as the 
level of documentation, key milestone dates and checkpoints, and communicates them in a way 
that is clearly visible and transparent to the entire team and can be updated in real time.  Each 
team member checks into the dashboard daily to retrieve work instruction report on progress and 
raise issues by a simple drag and drop of the subtasks from the pre-established integrated master 
schedule.   
The results for Program 11 were remarkable.  Program 11 encompassed two primary 
development tasks.  Before the program, the team determined that with the right effort, the first 
development task could be completed in the first half of the program.  The second development 
effort would require much more time but could be performed in parallel with the first 
development effort.  The first development effort was completed in month seven of the 12 month 
contract.  The second development effort was completed and a demonstration was performed in 
month 11 of the contract; the program finished nearly 10% under budget. Program 11 utilized 
several of the same engineering resources and had the same technical leader as Programs 1, 2, 
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and 3.  The difference between Program 11 and the other three was the introduction of the 
changes developed based on the results during the diagnosis phase.   
4.8  Realization Of The New Process  
4.8.1   Results of time impacts of all programs before and after application of the new 
kinetic process are shown below.   
 
 
Figure 9: All Programs Studied Chart 
 
Programs 1-7 using the DALC process were completed on time 14% of the time, and programs 
8-10 had the results from the diagnosis applied and will be discussed in more detail in section 
4.8.3. In addition, programs 11-20, using the Kinetic Problem Solving process, were completed 
on time 57% of the time. 
 
 
 
49 
 
4.8.2  Results of programs using the DALC process 
   
Figure 10: DALC Process Chart 
 
Programs 1-7, using the DALC process, resulted in 14% of programs being completed on time. 
These programs over ran the time available by 24 months, which resulted in an average of seven 
percent additional costs to the client as well as additional costs to Draper laboratory of four 
percent, on average.    
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4.8.3  The impact of programs 8, 9, and 10    
 
 
Figure 11: Action Research Interations On The DALC Process Chart 
 
The action planning, action taking, and evaluating phases results were applied to separate 
programs; the outcomes were documented. The results of the changes exhibited in Program 8, 
Result #1 Beyond First Order Risk Management, and Program 9, Result #2 Scope Creep and 
Expectation Management, showed positive improvement in terms of meeting the schedule and 
budget.  Program 10, Result #3 Iterative Parallelization, improved the time allocated for specific 
phases within the program, but the program did not finish on time or within budget.  The reason 
for this is one of the three facilities used to run the board build in parallel used a material that 
degraded, so a new board had to be built. Additional time was needed to remake the board. 
Evaluation of the cause showed the risk mitigation plan did not account for differences in three 
separate sites with the same industry standard.  This program reinforced the need to have 
compatibility testing beyond the normal risk management planning. 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
8 9 10
M
o
n
th
s
Programs 
Action Research Interations On The DALC 
Process 
Time Available Actual Time
51 
 
4.8.4  Results of programs using the Kinetic Process 
 
Figure 12: Kinetic Process Chart 
 
Programs 11-20, using the Kinetic Problem Solving process, resulted in 57% of those programs 
being completed on time. These programs over ran the time available by 11 months, which 
resulted in additional costs to the client, averaging three percent, and additional costs to Draper 
laboratory, averaging two percent.    
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5. 
Discussion 
This dissertation tests the feasibility of and documents the initial experiences with a 
collaborative process improvement to decrease the time to implement a problem solution for a 
crisis without sacrificing its quality. The results serve as a foundation for further process 
development and larger scale testing. 
These findings suggest that problem solvers who use the Kinetic Problem Solving 
process for critical problems will see the crisis nullified in a shorter amount of time, thereby 
reducing the effects of the crisis as well as saving money and time.  Problem solvers who 
continue to use the DALC process will be impacted by the delay in developing a course of 
action, allowing the crisis to grow exponentially and increasing its impact.  The findings of this 
study provide the foundation for theories of critical problem solving and enable time dependent 
crisis management teams to take advantage of the shortened program management time and, 
consequently, reduce the impact of a crisis event on an organization.   This research and the 
resulting analysis offer decision makers data that supports the advantages of changing crisis 
program management. 
Very real challenges are associated with change. In their Harvard Business Review article 
titled “Cracking the Change Code,” Beer and Nohiri argued that very few companies manage 
change as well as they would like: “Most of their initiatives - installing new technology, 
downsizing, restructuring, or trying to change corporate culture - have had low success rates. The 
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brutal fact is that about 70% of all change initiatives fail” (2000). One of the first hurdles to 
successful change is the culture of “This is how we have always done it.”   
A clear understanding of the DALC process and implementation of the Kinetic Problem 
Solving process are key to educating internal and external program managers on how the change 
will benefit them. Understanding the normal hesitancy to change, it is important to note that the 
Kinetic Problem Solving process is a small modification, not a total re-write of how programs 
are managed. Showing the risk reduction capability and the gains in completing programs in the 
time available can highlight the benefits of this modified approach.    
Once the program managers understand the value of the change, the rest of the team has 
to understand how the change will affect them as well.  The reasons for the change also have to 
be explained. Once everyone understands the desired change to the Kinetic Problems Solving 
process, implementation can start.  As the action research cycles are understood, the team will 
begin to see how improvements can be identified and incorporated into the process. 
5.1 The approach of using action research methodology to bring about change to the DALC 
process 
The research in this dissertation aimed to increase understanding of the DALC process 
and use the increased knowledge to develop effective improvement in the time needed to 
accomplish the DALC process.  The use of the five phases (Diagnosing, Action Planning, Action 
Taking, Evaluating, and Specifying Learning) provided a pragmatic approach that was 
instrumental in developing the Kinetic Problem Solving Process.  
Diagnosing occurred across seven programs that were critical and time sensitive. All but 
one of the programs failed to develop and implement a solution in the amount of time allotted.  
The use of lessons learned, root cause analysis, and decision trees revealed the following three 
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results: 1) looking beyond first order risk management, 2) managing scope creep and 
expectation, and 3) introducing Iterative Parallelization. 
The action planning, action taking, and evaluating phases were used as iteratively 
separate results and applied to separate programs; the outcomes were documented. The results of 
the changes exhibited in Programs 8 and 9 showed positive improvement in terms of meeting the 
schedule and budget.  Program 10 (that applied the iterative parallelization process) improved the 
time allocated for these events, but the program did not finish on time or within budget.  The 
reason the program did not finish within the allotted time or budget is one of the three facilities 
used to run the board build in parallel used a material considered industry standard, but when the 
board was installed into the system, the material degraded and a new board had to be built. 
Additional time was needed to remake the board. Evaluation of the cause showed the risk 
mitigation plan did not account for differences in three separate sites using the same industry 
standard.  This program reinforced the need to have compatibility testing beyond the normal risk 
management planning. 
5.2  The New Kinetic Problem Solving Process 
Action research methodology promotes cycles of repeating processes until a solution is 
defined well. In this study, a new action plan was developed that incorporated all three changes 
into a single plan.  The new process focused on efficient, effective program management to 
address program management using preliminary planning, fast start, program tracking, 
milestone/delivery, and lessons learned/implementation. It was tested in stages across three 
programs (i.e., Programs 8, 9, and 10). 
Good preliminary planning is a key element when time management is critical to an 
organization.  Critical time sensitive program support is not awarded to organizations without 
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some warning.  Steps can be pre-planned and executed before the award of a contract.  Pre-
planning decision trees can be established to streamline the steps to drive quickly to actual 
program work.  Team members familiar with the customer and the technology the customer uses 
can be identified. All of these steps can prepare organizations to move into a “Fast Start” profile. 
Fast start leverages the pre-planning steps and serves as the execution phase for these steps.  
During the fast start, the team members identified in the pre-planning phase are called into action 
and the risk management is addressed. 
Program tracking during critical time sensitive programs often is pushed to the side in the 
rush to get to a solution in the shortest amount of time.  The activity and performance 
information of many programs studied was collected but not properly tracked. The lack of proper 
tracking resulted in many processes being repeated, which wasted valuable time.  Financial, 
schedule, milestone, risk, and technical information must be documented and tracked. 
Milestones/Deliverables are two major components of program management.  Milestones are 
developed by the customer and provide decision points and key indicators of the progress being 
made.  The Kinetic Problem Solving process focuses on the deliverables. However, a solution 
that is delivered late may no longer be of value to the customer. 
Lessons learned/Implementation are important to the success of future programs and 
drive process refinement and improvement. Lessons learned are captured through the process 
and can be implemented as new information becomes available that could affect and improve the 
processes. 
The results of this dissertation show an increase of programs being completed on time, 
from 14% of programs using the DALC process to 57% of programs using the Kinetic Problem 
Solving process.   Using the DALC process, two of the seven programs resulted in additional 
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costs to the client, averaging seven percent. One of the seven resulted in additional costs to 
Draper laboratory, averaging four percent. Using the Kinetic Problem Solving process, two of 
the ten resulted in additional costs to the client, averaging three percent. One of the ten resulted 
in additional cost to Draper, averaging two percent.  
To expand the amount of data being studied, the findings of this dissertation will be 
demonstrated to other departments within Draper Laboratory.  A specific training program will 
be established that introduces the changes to the DALC process and tracks the results so that the 
data can be combined and grow knowledge in this research area. 
When the process is documented and training programs are established, the Kinetic 
Problem Solving process can be introduced to organizations outside of Draper Laboratory.  This 
introduction to outside organizations will ensure any laboratory specific bias can be removed and 
information can be obtained based solely on the success or failure of the process. 
The importance of further risk analysis to third order impacts has not been addressed 
within the DALC process, which has led to delays, cost overruns, and even failures in the course 
of performing development activities.  The third order analysis, the “Compatibility Test,” pushes 
one step further to take a system look at the end target device and how certain components, 
designs, or choices may impact the end user of the device or system based on the known risk 
elements. Failure to accomplish this additional mitigation impacts cost and the schedule of the 
solution. Continued evaluation of programs using both the DALC and Kinetic Problem Solving 
processes is needed to grow the data.   
5.3 Limitations 
The Kinetic Problem Solving process is not meant to be a static recipe to solve all 
research and development efforts, nor is this process applicable to all commercial scenarios.  The 
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Kinetic Problem Solving process is intended to provide a framework for implementation of a 
more efficient and tailored response to the unique defense technology challenges addressed by 
the specialists handling distinctive defense missions.  As is often the case with action research, 
this dissertation is based on the data and experience from within a single organization.  
While the Kinetic Problem Solving process serves as a starting point for many defense 
technology efforts, the implementers must be prepared to tailor this process to meet their needs.  
For example, some programs may be awarded to organizations with long term, established 
contract vehicles and detailed technology roadmaps, which will greatly reduce the amount of 
time to implement good action plans and fast starts.  While these organizations still need to 
address pre-planning, the number of variables and complexity of the pre-planning may be 
dramatically reduced, allowing better ability to allocate more time to improve the execution of 
the program. 
The number of programs studied in this research was limited to those managed at a single 
offsite location.  Future research should study a larger number of programs. In addition, a larger 
sample size of companies, labs, and government entities would be required to further refine the 
Kinetic Problem Solving process into a more broad statement of addressing defense technology 
inefficiencies.   
Due to the nature of this work and the security classification of the programs, inclusion of 
stakeholder perceptions and some participant perceptions was not possible under most 
conditions.  This reality results in some degree of bias since it is based solely on my perceptions. 
However, the diagnosis drew documentation about lessons learned and on objective data about 
completion times and budget.  In order for this research to be presented to the academic 
community, detailed case studies will have to be conducted to systematically collect data that 
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demonstrates how the root cause analysis is being discovered and documented.  Because research 
rigor is vitally important, additional data is needed to provide proof of rigor in applying the 
changes to the process; this will have to be accomplished with the addition of many more 
programs using both the DALC and the Kinetic Problem Solving processes.  Once a larger body 
of data has been collected and documented, the results will be able to meet the standards needed 
within the academic community. 
5.4 Future Research 
Future research needs to focus on the inherent bias of primarily performing this research 
from the perspective of a single company.  The unique factor in defense research and 
development is the great diversity of organizations that participate and contribute to the overall 
body of work.  Little thought is given to, for example, active duty personnel who contribute to 
these efforts by providing valuable information from the user’s perspective.  There is also a rich 
diversity of processes and organizations found within the commercial companies that service the 
government, such as very small, specialized technology companies as compared to large, 
multinational defense technology integrators.  The challenges, complexity of processes, and 
success factors range widely in these organizations.  When the ultimate customer (the 
warfighters putting their lives on the line for this country) and the ultimate financier (the 
taxpayer who bears the cost for all these activities) are examined, there is a common ground and 
need for improvement such that all the contributors should be able to frame and customize a 
more efficient process. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Changing the DALC process for critical time sensitive programs is achievable. The 
findings of this initial study as the baseline for the Kinetic Problem Solving process are the 
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foundation for going forward.  From this starting point, we can use the diversity available from 
the multitude of private companies, academic laboratories, government laboratories, military 
organizations, and best commercial practices to collect more data.  The additional data will 
validate and refine the Kinetic Problem Solving process into a more comprehensive, overarching 
process that benefits the defense technology needs in a real, cost effective manner.  Controlling 
costs, compressing schedules, and delivering better quality products are the goals of all involved 
in the development of defense technology as well as the end users of this technology.   
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Appendix 2: Lessons Learned by Program 
Program 3 (2013) 
Lessons Learned from Program 3 
Risk Management This program involved lower technical risk, but due to the volume of the 
work and the time required to complete all of the tasks and deliverables, 
the team has induced significant programmatic risks that ultimately 
impacted schedule, cost and deliverables.   
 
Action: 1) Do not ignore programmatic risks 
Schedule Significant errors were made in the program planning and staffing of this 
program from the beginning of the effort.  An integrated master schedule 
was not developed on this program until the 6 month mark of the program 
when a new system engineer joined the team.  No upfront planning efforts 
were made to project milestones and significant deficiencies in schedule 
management and revision were found. 
 
Action: 1) All programs need an integrated master schedule developed 
before or at the beginning of any new program 2) Schedule tasks and 
milestones need to be defined, communicated to the team and to the 
customer and regularly tracked and updated 3) Schedule planning needs to 
be mapped and evaluated against cost and staff plans for realism and 
ability to execute within the scope of the program 
Cost Management A fallacy occurred in the negotiation of the program costs in that due to 
the perceived low technical risk of the program, more work could be 
accomplished within budget.  A deeper look at total design, integration and 
test hours along with materials budgets was not performed in a rigorous 
manner prior to the start of the program. 
 
Action: 1) All program costs need to be priced per major task 2) Both 
management and technical reviews are needed to ensure proper matching 
of cost to the scope of the work 3) Regular tracking of the program budget 
throughout the program is needed 
Deliverables All deliverables were completed and met key requirements; however, 
these items were late.  Some of the deliverable items were not fully tested 
due to the tardiness of the deliverables and only subjected to basic unit 
testing parameters.  Some quality control and documentation items were 
not completed prior to delivery. 
 
Action: 1) Testing and quality control checks should not be sacrificed due 
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to late deliveries 2) Ensure adequate time is available in schedule to 
perform all testing and quality control checks. 
 
Program 1 (2014) 
Lessons Learned from Program 1 
Risk Management Team identified a set of significant risks including one major risk around a 
unique battery technology.  Customer made promises to provide deeper, 
more experienced technical experts on battery technology but did not.  
Team made attempts to ‘manage’ battery operation and performance from 
a system level without knowledge of the internal battery operation (i.e. 
treated battery as a black box).   
 
Action: 1) Team must ensure a risk item can be managed as a black box 
before pursuing this approach 2) All performance parameters for 
system/subsystem must be evaluated and better understood 3) Seek 
technical expertise/SME on technical risk items when not available on 
performing team 
Schedule Customer imposed aggressive schedule on program.  Team did not meet 
schedule and did not put resources into place to meet schedule.  
 
Action: 1) Validate that performing team is properly staffed to meet 
schedule 2) Raise concerns about schedule earlier in development cycle to 
ensure adequate time available for recovery and adjustments 
Cost Management Customer gave the ultimatum that a specific budget was available.  Team 
had developed a realistic cost model for the program which was more than 
20% higher than customer budget.  Management decided to pursue the 
high risk work in spite of the added risk of insufficient budget.  
Additionally, no internal investment or risk funding was applied to offset 
the cost deficiency. 
 
Action: 1) Investigate and further evaluate the business decisions that led 
to accepting the lower cost program budget 2) Evaluate why program was 
accepted at lower budget due to the future business opportunity; however, 
no strategic investment was made to offset the program costs and risks 
Deliverables All hardware deliverables were clearly defined.  All use case and system 
applications requirements were not defined in any written requirements.  
Once initial hardware effort was completed, customer began to deliver a 
set of verbal requirements about use cases and applications, many 
exceeding the hardware capabilities and the testing abilities of the team.  
Additionally, software provided by the customer was not functional nor 
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ready for testing in a timely manner causing additional schedule delays. 
 
Action: 1) Better requirements definition PRIOR to the start of the 
program 2) Improve customer expectation management and 
reduce/eliminate scope creep through verbal requirements 3) Develop test 
plans for deliverables earlier in program and review with customer in 
advance of formal acceptance testing 
 
Program 2 (2015) 
Lesson Learned from Program 2 
Risk Management In general, the technical and system level risks were low due to the 
complete control over the technical hardware and software used in the 
system.  This program is a technical refresh of an existing system, so 
existing technical issues are known and defined.  The subcontract 
management and separation between software and hardware development 
activities was a major risk factor and was not managed as well as it could 
have been. 
 
Action: 1) Communications between subcontractor and customer need to 
be managed more carefully 2) Subcontract documentation for work tasks 
needs to include sufficient detail to cover all prime contract deliverables 
Schedule This program was completed nearly four months after the original 
intended end date.  The customer took responsibility for some delays due 
to changes on their side; however, our team failed to complete the initial 
hardware design activities according to planned schedule and milestones.  
Customer approved work beyond the end of the period of performance, but 
this work was performed at our own cost.   
 
Action: 1) Need to improve engineering management oversight and 
involvement in monitoring progress of design activities 2) Complete 
regular schedule and milestone checks with more direct consequences for 
not meeting deadlines 
Cost Management The customer absorbed some of the additional cost for the program due to 
documented customer changes in deliverables and requirements.  
However, the team created cost overages due to poor execution during the 
design phase of the contract.   
 
Action: 1) More oversight and monitoring of progress towards major 
milestones during the design phase 2) Clearly defined leadership to 
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monitor costs and expenditures regularly on program 
Deliverables Customer expectations were not managed well on this program.  Verbal 
changes to the expected deliverables and program progress were 
communicated directly from subcontractor to customer without our team 
involvement on multiple occasions.  This program has experienced 
significant scope creep which has cost our team with a nearly 10% cost 
overrun to meet these undocumented requirements. 
 
Action: 1) Clear communication to subcontractors from beginning of 
contract that backdoor communications are not acceptable and will not be 
tolerated 2) Regularly document requirements, deliverables and any 
deviations to these items that arise and submit these through official, 
tracked channels 3) Setup regular face-to-face meetings with customer 
from beginning of program with defined agendas for meetings 
 
Program 11 (2016) 
Lesson Learned from Program 11 
Risk Management A more detailed risk management matrix was established at the beginning 
of this program.  Materials and design techniques were the two primary 
technical risk items while the use case was also a key risk items.  The team 
staffed the program from the beginning with two technical experts on the 
design and was able to setup a partnership with an external vendor who 
provided hardware on loan for comparisons to our team’s approach and 
technical SME support for the use case scenarios. 
 
Action: 1) Document the approach used to mitigate risk items and share 
with future teams 2) Emphasize the importance of finding SMEs to fill in 
the risks and gaps in technical knowledge and understanding 
Schedule A detailed integrated master schedule was developed before the start of the 
program that covered major milestones, peer reviews and integrated the 
schedule of an external partner with dependencies to our team’s schedule 
clearly marked and incorporated.  An agile tracking system was pre-
populated with all tasks for the program and used to run activities in 
parallel and provide real time feedback to the team. 
 
Action: None required; program was on schedule throughout the duration 
of the program and had margin to deal with challenges in real time; all 
deliverables completed early (Task 1: month 7, Task 2: month 11) 
Cost Management Before the program began, a thorough cost estimate was developed, 
reviewed by technical and program management and delivered to the 
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customer.  The cost was focused on ensuring adequate labor and materials 
hours were available to support the level of development for the program 
while still remaining cost competitive for the work. 
 
Action: None required; program was completed with ~10% of the total 
budget remaining 
Deliverables This program had two primary deliverables, so the team developed a 
parallel development effort but had focus periods.  Both major tasks were 
initiated at the beginning of the program, however, greater emphasis was 
made on the first task with an early delivery by month 6 of the 12 month 
effort.  Longer lead tasks that required wait times were completed for the 
second major task early in the program.  This approach proved effective 
and all deliverables were completed and all objectives were met, even with 
a change in scope early in the contract on the second major task. 
 
Action: None required; all deliverables were successfully completed and 
customer is making plans for additional follow-on work 
 
 
 
 
 
